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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
by the party to be charged, and the further problem of whether a
court has the power to lift the statute of limitations by a conditional decree.
Future Interests
The institution of adoption is ancient. Yet, anomalous as it
may be, the common law provided no method for the legal adoption of children. Consequently, an adopted- child had no rights
of inheritance where the foster parent died intestate; and where
a will was left, the question as to whether the terms "children",
"issue", etc., could be construed to include adopted children was
precluded. 23 Fortunately, the common law was changed by statute
in New York in 1887.24 Since then the legislature25 and the courtsg
have gradually but continuously enlarged and expanded the rights
of adopted children to equal those of natural children. But one
significant exception 'stands out: DOMEsTIc REL TioKs LAw §115
states: "(A)s respects the passing and limitatioh over of real
or personal property dependent under the provisions of any instrument on the foster parent dying without heir, the foster child
is not deemed'the child of the foster parent so as to defeat the
rights of remaindermen . .. ."
The first adjudication by the Court of Appeals dealing
with
2
There the testator died leaving
§115 arose in Matter of LeaskY.
a life estate in X., and upon X's death leaving children, then to
such children; but if no children, then to the residuary estate.
During X's life estate he adopted a son. The court declared that
the testator, by using the word leaving, intended that only natural
offspring should take. Consequently, the remainder estate passed
to the residuary legatees. The significance of the decision lies
in the Court's approach to the problem, an approach based on
the intention of the testator.
The same method was followed by the court in In Re Upjohn's WilZ, decided this year.2 8 Frederick Upjohn was the testator. His niece, Mrs. Childs, adopted a two month old daughter
23. RESTATEmT,,0PRorErY § 287, Comment on Subsection (1) a.

24. L 1887, c. 703.
25. For the legislative development see N. Y. DOMESTIC

RELATIONS LAW

§§ 109-118a.

26. The more significant decisions are Carpenter v. Buffalo General Elec. Co., 213
N. Y. 101, 106 N. E. 1026 (1914),; Matter of Walter's Estate, 270 N. Y. 201, 200 N. E.
786 (1936) ; Matter of Guilnartin's Will, 277 N. Y. 689, 14 N. E. 2d 627 (1938); Matter

of Horn, 256 N. Y. 294, 200 N. E. 786 (1931).
27. 197 N. Y. 193, 90 N. E. 652 (1910).
28. 304 N. Y. 366, 107 N. E. 2d 492 (1952).
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in 1905. The testator knew of the adoption, and with other members of the family joined in keeping it secret. In 1917 he drew
his will, creating a trust in favor of numerous relatives, including Mrs. Childs, and in the event that she died before the termination of the trust, then to her "lawful issue or descendants".
Upjohn died that same year. Upon Mrs. Child's death in 1950,
before the termination of the trust, the trustees petitioned the
Surrogate Court to construe the will and determine whether or
not the adopted child was the "lawful issue or decendant" of
Mrs. Childs. The Surrogate held not, and the Appellate Division
affirmed.29 The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed. Judge
Fuld reasoned that the words "issue" and "descendants" could
not be construed in vacuo, but that their meaning must be determined in the light of the testator's intention as shown from the surrounding circumstances. Testator knew of the adoption, and
treated the child with generosity and affection. He must have
realized that Mrs. Childs-over 40 years of age-would not likely
have any natural descendants. He was on intimate terms with
the Childs family, who frequently were his guests. And he was
an active partner in the pledge of secr.ecy. In the light of these
facts, Judge Fuld concluded, the only reasonable inference to
be deduced was that the testator in making his will intended that
the adopted child be considered the "issue" or "decendant" of
Mrs. Childs. Having determined the intention of the testator,
Judge Fuld went on to meet the objection raised by reason of
§115. He declared that the purpose of §115 was to prevent the
perpetration of fraud on the rights of the remaindermen through
an adoption for the very purpose of cutting of the remainder.
He then reasoned that there was no fraud to the remaindermen
if the testator intended the adopted child to limit their taking.
It is submitted that approach to §115 is the proper one, and that
the decision is in the best tradition of the court.
B. PersonalProperty
Bailments
The characterization of the relationship between a depositor
and a safe deposit company has produced some difference of
opinion in the courts throughout the United States. It has been
stated that the legal relation is that of bailor-bailee, 0 of licensorlicensee, 3 ' of landlord-tenant,3 2 and finally, a combination of all
29. 279 App. Div. 675, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 336 (2d Dep't 1951).
30. 6 Am. JuR. BAMMENTS, § 407.
31. 11 MINN. L. REv. 440 (1927).
32. VAN Zirm, BAX.LNTS AND CAPRmlS (2d. ed. 1908) § 196.

